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A LUKEWARM DEFENCE OF TRANSCENDENTAL MORALISM
The last reading of this week proposes 4 normative paradigms for thinking/acting, namely: moral agnosticism, pragmatism, unificationism and transcendental moralism. I will begin by saying that I think it is great this formulation explicitly links epistemology and morality as I believe they are inextricably linked. Epistemology is not this formal, boring, objective field of study, but should instead be understood as the highly political field which partially enacts the objects and subjects which we can know and therefore engage with. To pretend otherwise is peak "pseudorationalism".
However, I disagree with one of the main arguments in the article, namely that transcendental moralism necessarily results in deadlock when confronting aspects of wicked problems. In my view there is no contradiction between believing in an objective, antecedent, Real Good, and constructively engaging with the equally Real normative pluralism present in society. It is completely possible to accept that you (and rationality as a whole) are flawed and limited, while believing in a Reality (at least partially) independent of human construction. In fact, this is what classical rationalism, as exemplified by Descartes, was about: reason and its limits. It is, therefore, entirely consistent with the transcendentalist position to engage in deliberation, epistemological humility and "muddling through". As such, it is at least as capable of dealing with wicked problems as the other normative paradigms. In fact, I would argue that is is way more capable of dealing with them then the pragmatic and agnostic paradigms. Which, instead of addressing conceptions of the Real only attempt to fulfil the desires of their employers, thereby reifying the very process they are participating in. At least transcendental moralism is critical of these conceptions, whether that be of other’s incongruent conceptions of the Real, or more rationally real self-criticism as well.
Ultimately, I sincerely believe that while critiques of (especially modern) rationalisms are necessary, correct, and incredibly productive (essential even) - abandoning rationalism makes one weaker.
(Btw, this is one of the main points made by my favorite philosopher Otto Neurath, who I will write about next week:))